A Secure Network Node Approach to the Policy Decision Point in Distributed Access Control by Stowe, Geoffrey H
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth Digital Commons 
Dartmouth College Undergraduate Theses Theses and Dissertations 
6-1-2004 
A Secure Network Node Approach to the Policy Decision Point in 
Distributed Access Control 
Geoffrey H. Stowe 
Dartmouth College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/senior_theses 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stowe, Geoffrey H., "A Secure Network Node Approach to the Policy Decision Point in Distributed Access 
Control" (2004). Dartmouth College Undergraduate Theses. 39. 
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/senior_theses/39 
This Thesis (Undergraduate) is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at 
Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth College Undergraduate Theses by an 
authorized administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu. 
A Secure Network Node Approach to the
Policy Decision Point in Distributed Access
Control
Geoffrey Stowe
Advisers: Ed Feustel, Sean Smith, David Kotz




To date, the vast majority of access control research and develop-
ment has been on gathering, managing, and exchanging information
about users. But an equally important component which has yet to be
fully developed is the Policy Decision Point - the system that decides
whether an access request should be granted given certain attributes
of the requestor. This paper describes the research and implemen-
tation of a new PDP system for an undergraduate honors project.
This PDP system employs three unique features which differentiate it
from existing technology: collaboration capabilities, trusted manage-
ment, and interoperability with other access control systems. Security
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1 Introduction
This Honors Thesis was begun in the Fall of 2003 by Geoffrey Stowe under the
guidance of Dr. Edward Feustel. While it is a computer science thesis, and
hence inherently technical, I went to lengths to make this paper approachable
and interesting to all audiences. People without a technical background may
wish to read the appendix first for an explanation of some basic terms and
concepts.
1.1 Background
The explosive growth of the internet over the last ten years has changed the
way people live their lives in many different ways. Finding and sharing in-
formation from different parts of the world has gone from being a difficult
problem to something everyone takes for granted. The entire paradigm of
human communication has shifted to embrace the benefits of network tech-
nology. This shift has brought tremendous benefits, but with them come
new dangers from people exploiting weaknesses in electronic systems. Words
like ’hacker,’ ’virus,’ and ’encryption’ have entered the cultural vocabulary.
As government and industry continue to move their vital operations onto
the internet, the need for secure, reliable systems becomes more imperative.
This paper will discuss my research into a particular topic of network secu-
rity that has promising potential to secure one particular part of internet
communication.
Let’s use the analogy of medical records to take us through an electronic
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transaction. Say an insurance company enrolls a new client, and they want
to retrieve the patient’s records from his doctor across town. This is illus-
trated in Figure 1. The company sends a courier to the other office, and the
courier asks the receptionist there for the records. The receptionist calls a
doctor who must approve the release of the records. The receptionist will
probably ask for a signed note from the patient and might even call the in-
surance company to make sure the courier is supposed to be picking up this
information. The doctor will take all this information, decide the records
should be released, and will tell an assistant to retrieve the records from
their filing cabinet. The assistant then puts them in a sealed envelope and
gives them to the courier who brings them back to the insurance company.
This analogy transfers naturally to an electronic setting. Every time you visit
a webpage, a similar process will occur - your computer sends a request over
the internet to a webserver running on a remote system, and the webserver
sends back the webpage that you asked for. So for internet transactions,
the insurance office in our example is some application on your computer.
TCP/IP and other lower-level protocols play the role of the courier. The
doctor’s office is some remote server, the receptionist an application running
on that server, and the filing cabinet a database. Sealing the record in an
envelop is analogous to sending it over an encrypted channel, such as one
provided by SSL. 1 A certificate exchange 2 could simulate calling the insur-
1See Appendix A.3 for a description of SSL.
2See Appendix A.2 for a description of certificates.
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Figure 1: A model of obtaining medical records from a doctor’s office
ance company to make sure they authorized the courier. All of these steps
have been, and continue to be, thoroughly studied.
There is, however, another key component to this process which is only be-
ginning to be researched - the doctor. At the doctor’s office, he is the one
who decides whether to release the files or not. In an electronic setting this
is called the Policy Decision Point (PDP), and it is essentially an application
that decides whether to permit or deny a request. This is the topic of my
research and software development. Using common internet standards and
open source software, I developed a robust PDP system with features that,
to our knowledge, do not exist in any other software.
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In this paper I will first survey the current range of access control software.
Then, I will describe the components of my software implementation focus-
ing particularly on the original features. Finally, I will make suggestions
for future research and extensions of this project. In my appendices I also
continue discussion of various attempts and failures during the development
process.
2 Survey of Current Access Control Technol-
ogy
Access control and general network security are synonymous in many cases.
A firewall, such as iptables [Wel04], is the primary means of controlling access
to many online resources such as websites and email systems; firewalls are
also used to protect personal computers from hackers and viruses. This is a
program to moderate who is allowed to make any connection to a system.
For example, a company’s firewall might allow anyone in the world to access
the company’s website, but only allow certain people (or IP addresses, more
specifically) to access the company e-mail server. Firewalls and other similar
software can also be used to keep out viruses and protect against denial of
service attacks.3 However, as a means of access control they are limited to
making yes or no decisions regarding whether an IP address can make any
connection to a service. So, they can prevent unknown people from accessing
any part of a website, but they cannot figure out whether a certain person is
3See Appendix A.4 for a description of denial of service attacks.
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allowed to access a certain part of a website.
2.1 .htaccess
.htaccess is probably by far the most common access control scheme currently
used on the internet. When a website asks for a username and password be-
fore displaying a page, it is most likely using a .htaccess file. This essentially
password-protects a directory on a file system, so a web browser must present
a valid username/password pair when requesting a document from the server.
The content of a .htaccess file provides the simple rules for what usernames
or IP addresses can access a directory.
The .htaccess scheme is simple, so it can be secure in most circumstances,
but it is difficult to manage in a large system, and it does not hold up to seri-
ous attacks. Over regular channels, .htaccess is vulnerable to packet sniffing
and replay attacks, although these problems can be eliminated if it is run
over SSL. [Han01] Its decision-making capacity is limited to checking if a
username and password is correct. This means that access to a resource can
only be controlled by limiting who knows a valid password. In a large-scale
system, managing usernames and passwords for every user on every resource
is nearly impossible. Passwords might be written down or shared with other
users, defeating the objective of access control. The username/password
paradigm suffers other drawbacks such as the necessity to transmit pass-
words through some secure side channel, intruders cracking passwords, users
forgetting passwords, and other weaknesses that can be mitigated with Pub-
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lic Key Infrastructure (PKI).4 So, while .htaccess is a useful tool in many
circumstances, it cannot provide sufficient power and flexibility to the next
generation of distributed applications.
2.2 Shibboleth
Shibboleth, an Internet 2 project, is more sophisticated means of providing
access control decisions. The Shibboleth model is relatively straightforward:
a user contacts his or her institution and follows that institutions means of be-
ing authenticated. This part of the process could involve sharing personal in-
formation such as a person’s name, their credit card number, or a certificate.
When the user requests a service from a third party, that party can request
and obtain credentials from the user’s institution. If the credentials match
the service’s access control policy, it returns the requested service. [NS04]
Privacy is very important in the Shibboleth handshake, so Shibboleth in-
cludes a mechanism to allow the user to choose which attributes it wants
sent to the requested service. [Car01] In other words, a student trying to
access a course web page could allow his name to be sent to the web server
for verification, but the same student trying to access a political website
could forbid his name from being released. Also, since the service requests
credentials from the institution, many attributes will be generic instead of
uniquely identifying individuals. Also, Shibboleth includes the ability to use
an LDAP server to find more attributes about a person. This work is all
4See Appendix A.2 for a description of PKI.
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done at the origin site, so the Policy Decision Point itself does not contact
external attribute sources but rather uses only the information provided in
a request. These two features of privacy and LDAP support would probably
be useful in any robust access control system. Shibboleth is also embracing
SAML (which will be introduced later) and uses it for much of its query and
response traffic. [EC02] This could allow Shibboleth to communicate with
other access control systems, including ours.
Shibboleth, however, is lacking in several regards. Shibboleth’s version of
the Policy Decision Point is called the Resource Manager, and it is very sim-
ilar in concept to our system. However, Shibboleth leaves this part of the
model as essentially a black box without defining standard policy language,
combining algorithms, etc. Thus, it does not allow for collaboration between
multiple decision points on the service side. Dartmouth researchers have de-
veloped a SDSI/SPKI system called SPADE that will allow users to control
what attributes they release to their institution. This allows for decision
point collaboration, but it applies only to the client authentication part of a
Shibboleth exchange. [NS04] So, Shibboleth’s RM model allows for only one
institution to control a given database. Also, it does not define any uniform
policy language, so it cannot utilize the flexibility found in XACML. Our
system includes both these features. So, our access control system utilizing
XACML could conceivable be used with Shibboleth through the common lan-




The PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standards validation
(Permis) is a European project designed to determine user authorization
when accessing a computer system. One of their large-scale implementations
is in Bologna, Italy and it allows architects and other construction profes-
sionals to view, modify, and comment on building plans online. Permis takes
the approach of dividing certificates into two categories: permanent identity
(PKI certificates) and changeable attributes (PMI certificates). PKI certifi-
cates can be issued by standard CAs just as they are under other schemes,
but PMI certificates are only issued by the responsible organization. In other
words, if an individual wants to certify that he is an architect for Company
A, he will get a certificate issued by Company A.
The Permis infrastructure is similar to that of Shibboleth in that it allows
for individual sites to issue certificates attesting to attributes they can verify.
Also, like Shibboleth, it leaves definitions of specific Policy Decision Point
operation to whoever implements the system. Currently, Permis is being in-
tegrated into the Internet 2 project NMI, so I would expect it to begin using
some of the SAML standards in later versions. [BL03]
2.4 CORBA
CORBA is a middleware infrastructure that allows processes running on dis-
tributed hosts to securely communicate over the internet. [Gro02] While this
is not directly applicable to access control, communicating between processes
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involves many of the same problems. For example, when a CORBA object
on one computer receives a stub request, it must figure out whether or not
to execute the request. CORBA is used as guidance for some of the protocol
issues which arise in our system.
2.5 Home Grown System
In the summer and fall of 2003, I worked on a Homeland Security Council
project called Livewire which involved government and private sector em-
ployees playing a simulated cyber attack on the nation’s infrastructure. One
of my responsibilities was to restrict webpages on our system so only appro-
priate players could see them. I mention this problem because I believe it
will become very common in other settings. We were using client certificates
to authenticate users and keep unauthorized individuals out of the system, so
we felt using passwords and .htaccess files was cumbersome and unnecessary.
Since we created the client certificates ourselves, we included both unique
identifiers and group identifiers that we planned to use to control access. We
wanted a straightforward way of pulling a single field off the client certificate
and performing a simple check to either permit or prohibit access. We also
wanted to prevent users from accessing the system outside of the appropriate
timeframe, and we wanted to be able to make changes to our policy quickly
without disrupting the rest of the system. Finally, we did not want to use a
system like Shibboleth that would first require learning the nuances of their
system, then setting up a Shibboleth site in front of our servers and, ideally,
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a Shibboleth site at each of our clients.
We could find no system which fit all of our needs. Ultimately, we modified
the Apache configuration files to hardcode which certificates were allowed
into which directories. While this solution worked, it was less than optimal
for two reasons: security and ease of use. Since we relied on our web server
to make access control decisions, any hack of our webserver would compro-
mise the entire system. This was a particularly dangerous vulnerability since
webservers are complicated systems - thus they are prone to exploits and
cannot easily be run on secure hardware. Also, modifying Apache configura-
tion files is a tedious process that is prone to error. Making changes on the
fly is impossible since the webserver must be restarted before changes take
effect. What we ideally wanted was a way to write an access control policy,
plug various components into Apache, and have everything work. This was
a large part of my motivation for building this system.
2.6 SAML and XACML
The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS) is a group representing both academia and industry that defines
standard ways of encoding different types of information. The two OA-
SIS standards we are concerned with are the Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) and the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML). These are both XML5 specifications, meaning they define what
5See Appendix A.1 for a description of XML.
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information can and must be included in communications at various stages
of an access control dialogue. SAML defines mechanisms to relay access re-
quests, results, and any required intermediary information. This is used by
many organizations as a method of communicating authorization informa-
tion. However, SAML does not specifically define how the Policy Decision
Point should operate. In other words, both a SAML request and a SAML
response are well defined, but getting from one to the other is left up to the
user to implement in any way.
XACML version 1.0 was published in 2003, 2 years after the original SAML
specification. Its major feature is that it defines a common way to represent
access control policies. This is the mechanism that takes a request and de-
cides what response to return - the heart of a PDP. However, XACML also
defines its own request and response formats, so it is not directly compatible
with SAML. Sun Microsystems has written an implementation of XACML
in Java which includes the XML parsing, basic decision making algorithms,
policy combining algorithms, and the capability to add custom attributes
and algorithms. But, the Sun implementation does not include the capabil-
ity to run on a network and read requests over a secure socket. This is a key
step in enabling XACML to be used in real-life settings.
Using the Sun XACML implementation as a core for my software, I extended
the software to develop a new conception of the PDP. I designed the PDP
to function as an isolated node enabling three new features: reliable policy
management, PDP collaboration, and compatibility with other access con-
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trol systems. Policy management works by sending XACML requests to the
PDP server in order to add policies or start instances of a PDP. Since they
take the form of an XACML request, they can be permitted or denied the
same as any other request. PDP collaboration can allow multiple computers,
and even multiple organizations, to all simultaneously control access to one
resource. Since the PDP server is one distinct node, it can forward requests
to other PDP servers and require approval from them all before granting
access. Finally, I implemented a simple translation from SAML to XACML
that will allow this PDP system to communicate with other access control
programs using the common language of SAML.
2.7 Cardea
Cardea is one of the test sites currently experimenting with both SAML
and XACML. A project of the NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division,
Cardea employs a very similar model of access control to ours, which I will
describe in the next section. It’s unclear how much of their model they
have implemented, but they propose having both a SAML PDP and an
XACML PDP. Also, their PDPs cannot communicate with each other to
both independently verify a decision, nor with other PDPs outside their
system. [Lep03] Our model proposes a PDP that can handle both SAML
and XACML as well as communicate with PDPs in other systems. So while
Cardea approaches the same questions as we do in much the same way, the
PDP described in this paper allows for more extensive operability than is
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found in their system.
2.8 Our Entire Project
This research was carried out in collaboration with Paul Mazzuca and Fang
Pei, both of Dartmouth College. Our goal is to produce a complete access
control system implementation following the diagram below. The general
Figure 2: Our access control model
paradigm we are using is that some client makes a request to a service. A
13
common example is a web browser requesting a webpage from a webserver.
The service then collects whatever relevant attributes it knows about the
client. Typical attributes could be the client’s IP address, a client certificate,
or a name the client has sent to the webserver. The service will bundle all
this information into either an XACML request or a SAML request and then
send it to the PDP. The PDP will make a decision based on the request, its
internal policies, environment information such as the date and time, and any
other external attributes it wishes to gather. Once it has made a decision, it
will create an XACML or SAML response which it sends to the PEP. If the
PEP believes the response is valid, it will release the requested resource to
the service. In the webpage example, this would entail reading the contents
of a file from a disk and transmitting the contents to the service. The service
will then return the requested information to the client.
3 The Core Software
My software consists of several different components of different levels of
complexity. Since I designed them sequentially, my design of earlier compo-
nents fed naturally into the design of later components. So, I will describe
the software in roughly the chronological order of implementation. Some
of the later features were designed to replace the earlier ones, for example
SSL sockets should be used instead of regular sockets, but the final software
includes all the components I will describe below. The original features I
added are discussed in subsequent sections.
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3.1 Sun’s XACML Software
As a member of OASIS and a leader in their field, Sun Microsystems is at
the cutting edge of distributed network systems. After OASIS published
its XACML standard, Seth Proctor, a Sun employee, led an open-source
development team to implement the XACML standard in Java. The result
was a powerful piece of software which implemented all the OASIS standards.
Specifically, it provided for the creation of Policy Decision Points which could
process request objects and return responses. Many of the standard policy
combining algorithms were included. However, it would only function if all
the information it required was on a single computer. As the documentation
says: ”This distribution does not provide any kind of support for sending
requests and responses over a network (e.g., to support an online PDP ser-
vice)”. [Mic03b]
Sun’s XACML implementation is freely available at their website, sunx-
acml.sourceforge.net, and it includes some helpful guides for installing and
using it. My first tests with the software involved reading in sample XACML
policies from local files, evaluating them, and returning a result. For example,
the sample program that comes with the implementation is as follows:
// load the policies
FilePolicyModule policyModule = new FilePolicyModule();
policyModule.addPolicy("Policy.xml");
// setup the policy finder
PolicyFinder policyFinder = new PolicyFinder();
Set policyModules = new HashSet();
policyModules.add(policyModule);
policyFinder.setModules(policyModules);
// module to provide the current date & time
CurrentEnvModule envModule = new CurrentEnvModule();
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// setup the attribute finder
AttributeFinder attrFinder = new AttributeFinder();
List attrModules = new ArrayList();
attrModules.add(envModule);
attrFinder.setModules(attrModules);
// create the PDP
PDP pdp = new PDP(new PDPConfig(attrFinder, policyFinder, null));
// now work on the request
RequestCtx request =
RequestCtx.getInstance(new FileInputStream("request.xml"));
ResponseCtx response = pdp.evaluate(request);
// for this example we’ll just print out the result
response.encode(System.out);
As the comments indicate, creating a PDP involves several steps: loading
in an XML file that describes the policy, setting up a policy finder, setting
up an attribute finder, and finally starting the PDP. Then, a request can be
read in from an XML file and passed along to that PDP. Finally, the response
will be printed out.
3.2 Integrating Network Sockets
The simplest feature of my PDP system is the ability to read in requests
over a network socket. This required creating a new class that would do the
following:
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• Create a PDP
• Read requests from a socket
• Process those requests
• Return the result over a socket
• Handle errors so a failure will not crash the entire system
Since creating a PDP involves specifying which policies it should use, this
software needed to include a mechanism for reading this information over a
socket. Thus, since the code had to respond to different requests in different
ways, designing my software included designing a protocol and a mechanism
to manage policies.
3.3 Simple Policy Management
I created a new class called PolicySet which would store a list of policies
someone wanted to include in a PDP. This class basically consists of a Hash-
Set of policies and some helper functions. For a user to add a policy, he or
she would first store the policy on the local file system through passing the
STORE command followed by the XML text of the policy. Then, the user
would ADD that policy to a PDP. Although it appears to the user as if he or
she is adding policies directly into a PDP, in reality the policies are simply
being collected to be added all at once when the PDP is started. The user




Let’s return to our model for access control and envision a theoretical com-
pany implementing it. Since the PDP can be separated entirely from the
rest of the system, it could ideally run on a secure system which will provide
the utmost assurance that the decisions it makes can be trusted. However,
since secure hardware is expensive, it would be reasonable for this company
to want all of its access control decisions made on one system. Therefore, I
endeavored to allow multiple PDPs using shared policies to run on the same
platform. Since they would all be listening on the same port, this meant
building a layer of multiplexing that would direct requests to the correct
PDP.
On a low level, multiplexing PDPs meant building a Java Set of references to
different PDP objects. So, I created a class called PDPSet which would store
PDP objects along with a name and allow access to those PDPs in order to
evaluate requests. This again involved creating a class that stored references
using a HashSet and managed modifications to that HashSet with various
helper functions. One issue which arose was how to handle a user who re-
quests creating a PDP which has the same name as an existing PDP. In my
implementation I ignore such requests, but theoretically one could design a
policy for how to handle this issue. Later I will discuss my approach to the
generalized question of how to authorize modifications to the PDP server.




My original text-based protocol was modeled after the File Transfer Proto-
col [PR85] and the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [Pos82]. Basically, the
client would connect to the server’s port and issue commands followed by
parameters. The options are as follows:
• STORE policy - This command should be followed by a newline, then
the text of an XACML policy. The policy should be terminated by a
’.’ on a new line. It will save the policy on the local file system and
allow the user to LOAD that policy into a PDP.
• LOAD pdp policy - This will add the specified policy to the specified
PDP. Once the PDP is started, it will be created with all of the policies
that have been loaded.
• LIST pdp - Lists the policies that have been loaded into the specified
PDP.
• LIST ALL - Lists all the policies that have been stored on the system.
• START pdp - Will start running the specified PDP.
• EVAL pdp - This command should be followed by a newline, then the
text of an XACML request. The request should be terminated by a ’.’
on a new line.
19
• DEFAULT pdp - This command will set the default PDP to be used
in evaluating binary requests (discussed in the next section.)
• HELP - Will print out a summary of the commands and their func-
tions.
The code implementing these features can be found in the Appendix in the
file TextListener.java.
3.6 Binary Requests
The text-based protocol worked well in testing, but in an actual implemen-
tation the PDP would communicate mainly through an automated protocol
with a PEP. Therefore, we realized it was necessary to make the process of
sending a request to the PDP as simple as possible. Note that in the sam-
ple code shown in a previous section, requests are parsed into RequestCtx
objects which are then passed to the PDP object. We wanted to create the
simplest way to transmit a RequestCtx object from one system to another.
A RequestCtx object, and a ResponseCtx object will return their XML en-
coding by using the encode() method. This method takes an OutputStream
as a parameter, so this allows us to stream XML over a socket. At the other
end of the transaction, we can call the RequestCtx.getInstance() method and
pass in the InputStream which comes out of the other end of the socket. As-
suming the XML was successfully transmitted over the socket, this method
will send both RequestCtx and ResponseCtx objects over a network.
After trying several approaches to the problem of reliably transmitting XML
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over a socket6, we settled on an implementation that would read all necessary
input into a byte array, then convert that to a stream to send to the XML
parser. This allowed us to keep the streams (running over a socket) open for
multiple requests. The one drawback to this approach is that it uses a class
called StringBufferInputStream [Mic03a] which is deprecated as of the JDK
1.1. If future implementations also buffer the data coming across the socket,
I would recommend using a method that does not involve the StringBuffer-
InputStream class. However, this method has worked fine for us in all of our
tests.
3.7 Adding Threads
Once I updated the PDPNode software to listen on multiple ports for different
kinds of requests, I needed to add threads so it could wait for a connection on
two ports at once. Because the Java Socket.accept() method is bound to one
socket, the method will pause the entire program until a connection is made
if threads are not used. I used the built-in support for threads included with
Java; the one trade-off in this addition is a slightly degraded performance
speed.
A further complication is that these multiple threads need to share the same
resource. That is, both the binary listener and the text listener need to use
the HashTable of PDPs because they will be evaluating decisions using the
same PDPs. So, we need to synchronize the threads. This requires creating
6See the Appendix for a more detailed description of our other attempts at sending
RequestCtx objects across a socket
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the shared data objects in the parent class and then passing in the same
objects as parameters to both threaded listener classes. [Mic03c]
The final version of my software has four threads running simultaneously:
one listening for text-based requests, one listening for object-based requests,
one listening for object-based requests on an SSL socket, and one listening
for management requests on an SSL socket.
3.8 Integrating SSL
As I describe in the Appendix, SSL is a mechanism for encrypting commu-
nications over a network. This is vital to the security of our PDP for several
reasons: it prevents 3rd parties from tampering with data passing into or out
of the PDP, it prevents 3rd parties from seeing private information that may
be included with a request, and it authenticates both the client and server in
an interaction. To take advantage of this last feature, we require both client
and server authentication for all our connections.
Java includes support for SSL sockets, so I based the SSL support in my soft-
ware off of previous examples. [Par02] To communicate with another com-
puter over SSL, both systems need to obtain a certificate, set up a key store
and a trust store. For each certificate a computer generates, it must add the
corresponding private key to the key store. The key stores we set up are
protected by a password, but they are not particularly secure. Ideally, the
key store will be protected by being located on special hardware. The trust
store is a collection of certificates from other computers you intend to com-
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municate with. Ideally they will be signed by a CA that you trust, hence the
term trust store. In our experiments we used self-signed certificates which
are not optimal from a security standpoint but are easier to manage.
The final version of my SSL software is located in the file SSLListener.java.
4 PDP Collaboration
No existing access control system that we have encountered can employ mul-
tiple Policy Decision Points. In many ways, the notion of multiple PDPs
is a contradiction - how can one decision be made in multiple places? But
implementing collaboration between PDPs allows for interesting scenarios in
the realms of both technology and society.
Collaboration in a capitalist economy is a double-edged sword because it
can both increase productivity and limit competition. Often times com-
petitors use subtle back-channel means to communicate. [DS96] Sometimes
competitors even attempt to sabotage each other by withholding important
information. [Ker99] As network technology becomes more and more perva-
sive in everyday life, communication becomes easier to disguise and collusion
becomes more difficult to adequately control. I believe a reliable, open-source
PDP system, such as the one I have developed, can enable trusted cooper-
ation between organizations and alleviate fear of illegal collusion. If a PDP
policy is understandable, and the PDP software is resistant to tampering,
then people can commit to a cooperative effort confident that they know the
exact extent of their involvement.
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Consider the following scenario: Company A, Company B, and Company C
are competitors in the same industry, and none of them trust each other.
They all collect copious data on their customers, and they all want to per-
form market research. However, they all want to include each other’s data in
their analyses in order to utilize the largest sample possible. Clearly they are
not willing to provide each other with detailed records of their clients, but
they are willing to share anonymous or aggregated data. Furthermore they
want to continue sharing data in the future instead of setting up a one-time
aggregated database. The government learns of this, and wants to ensure
that this collaboration is limited to market research and is not a means of
shrewdly colluding to fix prices.
This scenario is realistic, but with existing technology it cannot be accom-
plished. Currently there is no generic system which can allow multiple entities
to collectively make access control decisions. Our model specifically isolates
the Policy Decision Point as a separate system. This allows the PDP to
perform any actions before returning a decision, including contacting other
PDPs.
Since PDP collaboration is a new idea, our software approaches it in a fairly
simple, yet highly extendable, fashion. I will explain how our implementation
works, what issues arose, and how we chose to address them.
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4.1 PDP Collaboration in Our Software
When setting up a PDP, the user can specify other ”external PDPs” that
must agree on a decision before the PDP returns a result. These are specified
by providing an IP address, a port on which the PDP is listening for object
requests, and the name of the PDP. When a request comes in, the PDP firsts
evaluates it using its own policy. Then, it contacts each external PDP, sends
the request, and gets a response. Lastly, it combines all the results together
into a final decision that it sends to the user. This is loosely modeled after
the protocol for DNS queries - if a local DNS server cannot resolve a request,
it will forward the request to another server. [Moc87] An alternative model
would have been to require the PEP to obtain permission from multiple
PDPs. However, we felt this would have changed the role of the PEP by
requiring it to store something resembling a policy.
Manually specifying which external PDPs to collaborate with when the PDP
is created is inconvenient, hard to replicate, and hard to keep records of.
This can be solved by including the list of external PDPs in the XACML
policy itself. That way the decision making process is documented in XML
and can be replicated by loading the same policy into a different PDP. This
would also allow for some degree of logic tests to be performed in choosing
which external PDPs to contact. For example, maybe requests during the
day require the additional consent of another PDP, but requests at night
require the additional consent of a different PDP. It is hard to imagine any
such scenario, but the possibility should be provided. However, for now we
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chose not to encode external PDPs in policies because we did not want to
make any modifications to XACML as it is currently specified.
Figure 3: A sample PDP collaboration configuration
Figure 3 illustrates an interaction that might occur when a request comes
in to PDP 1. It contacts PDP 2 and receives a permit decision. It then
contacts PDP 3 which contacts PDP 4 and receives a deny decision. This
is relayed to PDP 1 which issues a deny decision. This configuration could
be the result of Companies 1, 2, and 3 jointly protecting a resource. Also,
Company 3 and Company 4 might have a separate agreement to monitor
and authorize each other’s actions. PDP 4 could also be a regulatory agency
charged with assuring Company 3 is not participating in any questionable
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practices.
This current scheme does not consider what happens if one of the required
PDPs is unreachable. This could legitimately result in either ignoring that
PDP or automatically rejecting the request. Say, for example, that one of
the external PDPs is connected through an unreliable ISP in Asia and wants
to be contacted solely for logging purposes. It may be reasonable to ignore
this PDP if it cannot be contacted. However, in a different scenario the
desired behavior may be to reject any request when all PDPs cannot be
reached. Say Company A and Company B are controlling a database, and
clever hackers infiltrate Company A. This allows them to create all the faulty
credentials they need to successfully trick Company A’s PDP into granting
access.7 Then, they launch a Denial of Service attack against Company
B’s PDP causing it to be unreachable from Company A. In this scenario,
Company A’s PDP will hopefully return a decision that denies access. The
point of these examples is to illustrate that the question of what to do when a
PDP is unreachable should also be specified in a policy. This will allow users
to control PDP behavior in an easily customizable, replicable way. Again, we
did not pursue any development in this direction because the current version
of XACML does not include any such capability.
The final aspect of this scheme was to combine the responses from external
PDPs. For our purposes, we simply checked to see if any denied access,
7In this scenario, the PDP itself is not infiltrated - just other parts of the network. In
the Security Considerations section, I will discuss the possibility of the PDP itself being
compromised.
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otherwise the PDP will permit the request. This will probably be the most
common combination algorithm desired because it requires all parties to grant
access. However, it is conceivable that some scheme could require just one
PDP to permit access. Or, perhaps two specific PDPs would have to permit,
then one of any three others would have to permit. Since we recommend
that the list of external PDPs be written in the XACML policy, it is only
natural for that policy to include the rules for combining the results.
4.2 Future Developments
Communication between PDPs is a new paradigm, and hence opens many
other possibilities for future development. For instance, load balancing or
fault protection can be incorporated into future distributed PDP implemen-
tations. As long as all nodes speak the common language of SAML, their
collaboration can produce interesting results. Using SAML also provides a
means of keeping authoritative records of what decisions were made and who
approved them. Since SAML objects can be signed, a permit decision that
includes a digital signature would provide incontrovertible evidence that a
PDP authorized an action. This could be tremendously beneficial to busi-
nesses that require strict accountability.
5 SAML
The leading open-source implementation of SAML is written by Scott Can-
tor at Ohio State University and called OpenSAML. There is practically no
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sample OpenSAML code available anywhere on the internet. As the Open-
SAML readme file says, ”[t]here are no explicit samples yet, but there are
test programs and higher level code in the Shibboleth codebase that would
help a novice see what some of the classes do.” [Can02]
The following packages all needed to be downloaded, installed, and added to
the project build path in order for OpenSAML to function, so they are all
included in the final version of my software:
• xmlsec - This package provides various XML security services including
the ability to sign XML documents. [GPLMvdK03]
• log4j - This is a an efficient, general-purpose logging utility. It uses the
concept of inheritance to provide its users with a high degree of control
over logging activity. [Bea04]
• Xerces - This is an XML parser developed by The Apache Software
Foundation. It implements the XML Document Object Model which
is required for using Open SAML. [Fou04c]
• Xalan - This is an XSLT processor also developed by the Apache Soft-
ware Foundation. [ea03]
I also upgraded to the Beta version of the Java 1.5.0 Runtime Environ-
ment. [Mic04a] With all of these packages, I was finally able to create simple
SAML objects.
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5.1 Translating SAML into XACML
Currently the functions of SAML and XACML overlap in the realm of making
access requests. A system employing OpenSAML would send a SAMLAutho-
rizationDecisionQuery to the Policy Decision Point and receive a SAMLAu-
thorizationDecisionStatement in response. To use XACML for our policies,
on the other hand, we must send a RequestCtx into the PDP and receive a
ResponseCtx. So while SAML and XACML perform a similar function in en-
coding requests and responses, they are not strictly compatible. To reconcile
this problem, our model puts a system in front of the PDP that translates
requests in other formats into XACML requests. So, a SAML request will
enter our system where it is translated into an XACML request and then
sent to the PDP. The challenge at this stage becomes to translate from a
SAML request to an XACML request. According to Scott Cantor, no one
has yet come up with a way to convert between these two. [Can03] I will first
outline the parts of a SAML request in the OpenSAML implementation, and
then explain the choices I made in implementing the translation.
A SAMLAuthorizationDecisionQuery has four components: a SAMLSub-
ject, a resource, a Collection of actions, and a Collection of evidence. SAML
Subjects have two parts, and either or both can be present in a SAML sub-
ject. The first is the NameIdentifier. This consists of a name, a name quali-
fier which is used when usernames from multiple locations can overlap, and a
name format. The second is SubjectConfirmation which allows the identity
of the user to be confirmed. This consists of a ConfirmationMethod which is
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Figure 4: A SAML request and the corresponding XACML request
a URI reference which can be used to validate the subject, additional Sub-
jectConfirmationData, and KeyInfo to allow the subject’s cryptographic key
to be checked. [MMea03]
A Subject in XACML is essentially a set of Attributes, with the option of
specifying a subject category. If none is specified, then the default is used.
Each Attribute has 4 parts: the URI to identify what kind of attribute it is,
an issuer to declare who is asserting this attribute belongs to this subject, a
timestamp, and finally the attribute value. This is closely analogous to, for
example, a government issued ID card. Its size and layout distinguish it as
an ID card (analogous to the URI), the issuer is indicated by the template,
a seal, and possibly a hologram, the issue date is the same as a timestamp,
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and finally the person’s name, birth date, and address printed on the card
is the value of the attribute. A subject can have more than one attribute.
Following the ID card example, a person would be a subject, and the drivers
license, college ID, and credit cards in their wallet would be their multiple
attributes. To us a computer example, a subject could be a UNIX user-id,
and attributes could be what their password is, what groups they belong to,
and what processes they are running.
SAML is built upon the assumption that each request will have only one
subject - this is reasonable in most cases, particularly those of single-sign-on
scenarios which is one of the major goals of SAML. However, XACML extends
the abstraction of access control to allow for multiple subjects. Therefore, in
translating between SAML and XACML we will always build requests with
one subject.
So, returning to the challenge of converting from SAML to XACML. An
XACML request includes four components: a Set of subjects, a Set of re-
sources, a Set of actions, and a Set of environments. The action and the re-
source can be translated almost directly from the SAML request, and SAML
does not contain any environment information, so we can ignore that. The
difficult part is converting a SAML subject into an XACML subject.
XACML as it is currently defined does not include any means of verifying
information in a subject statement, so we’ll ignore the ConfirmationMethod
and ConfirmationData sections of the SAML subject. Therefore, we are left
with a name, a name qualifier, and a format. The format isn’t applicable to
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XACML because the subjects we will handle will always have a subject-id,
and additional attributes are evaluated separately. We will construct two
attributes - for one the value will be the name, for the other the value will
be the name qualifier. When we bundle these two Attributes in a Set, they
are ready to be included in an XACML request.
Our final step is to then construct the XACML request so it can be passed
off to the PDP. In implementing this I ran into Java exceptions when I tried
printing out the initial SAMLAuthorizationDecisionQuery. It appears other
people have encountered this same error [Dor03] so I avoid printing this out
in my code. Aside from that, this conversion appears to work for all the
SAML requests I tested it on. The algorithm may require some modifica-
tions for more complicated transactions since I don’t utilize all the elements
of SAML and also only use SAMLAuthorizationDecisionQuery objects in-
stead of utilizing all of the components of SAML communication. However,
this has worked for our purposes and provided the first PDP that can handle
both SAML and XACML requests.
6 PDP Management
The next major feature of this PDP system is an improved mechanism for
managing policies and individual PDPs. Let’s review the essential actions
we can perform on a PDP. We can store a policy, load a policy, set a default
policy, list policies, start a PDP, and evaluate a request. The management
features we’ll consider are storing, loading, setting a default, and starting.
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We need to ensure that only people who are properly authorized can perform
these actions. But we, of course, already have a system to determine if
someone is authorized to perform an action - XACML.
To use XACML as the authorization tool for PDP managment, I needed to
do two things - formulate a way for management requests to be written in
XACML, and create management policies to evaluate these requests. An
XACML request contains a subject, an action, and a resource. The subject
will be used to identify who is making the request. For management requests,
the action will be one of the actions listed above - store, load, default, start.8
Since all these actions (except store) are performed on individual PDPs, the
resource will be the name of a PDP. For example, if I want to load the policy
myPolicy2 into the PDP myPDP we would send a request where the action
is load myPolicy2 and the resource on which we’re performing this action is
myPDP. One complication arises in the action of storing a policy. Remember
this requires passing in the XML text of the policy. So, in this case the text
of the policy will be the second action passed in.
If we are modifying policies based on the decision of policies, we of course need
some ”root” policy to start from. When this software first starts, it reads a
configuration file that specifies where the root policy is. Ideally this will exist
on the local filesystem, but theoretically the software could be extended to
put the root policy anywhere. Using this approach, the PDP node becomes
8I intentionally chose not to include EVAL in this feature for reasons I will explain in
the Security Considerations section.
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even more independent. Once started, an administrator should be able to
make any modifications by communicating with the PDP. In other words,
making changes does not require rewriting a configuration file, and the PDP
should never have to be restarted.
The idea of using a system to manage itself is by no means new to computer
science. In fact, the basic tenant of a computer that differentiates it from
other electronics in that it can reprogram itself. But as far as we know, this is
the first time this approach has been applied to an XML-based access control
system.
This code can be found in the file ManagementListener.java. It currently
runs over an SSL socket so the text of policies cannot be intercepted by an
adversary.
7 Security Considerations
Since the goal of this PDP Node software is to improve the security of other
systems, it is imperative that it be as invulnerable to exploitation as possible.
I will describe the security decisions I made, and the features I included in
this software. I will also discuss possible improvements that can be made in
the future. Note that the best possibility of completely securing the PDP
system would be to implement it on secure hardware. I discuss my research
into this possibility in the Appendix.
35
7.1 Core Software
The major security feature of the core software is its SSL capability. This
will prevent anyone from intercepting requests or responses and also prevent
replay attacks. Also, since we require client authentication, the possibility
of an intruder masquerading as the PDP, or fooling the PDP into communi-
cating with a bogus service or PEP, is almost nil.
The question of how the PEP, PDP, and service first find each other, however,
has not yet been addressed in this paper. Presumably, in most installations
now conceivable, the same administrators will set up each component. In
this case, the IP addresses or hostnames of each can be hardcoded, and the
relevant certificates can be loaded into the appropriate trust stores. An IP
address alone is not very secure, but using certificates as an additional means
of authentication should make connections reliable. However, as more and
more people begin to take access control seriously, the desire for, and abun-
dance of PDP servers will expand. In this case, a service and PEP may
have different choices for which PDP to utilize. Here some secure, trusted
variation of a DHCP [RDBV+03] server could be implemented to mitigate
associations with different PDPs.
7.2 PDP Collaboration
Since PDP collaboration uses the same interfaces as the regular request-and-
response protocol, it presents few additional security risks. As I discussed
earlier, policies for handling unreachable PDPs and combining PDP results
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should be specified by an administrator, so managing the reliability of other
systems and the connections to those systems is left in the hands of the those
setting up the PDP.
The major vulnerability PDP collaboration presents could come in a situation
where two PDPs are controlling the same resource. If one of the PDPs
is hacked, then an attacker could use that PDP to manufacture ”permit”
decisions without consulting the other PDP. This decisions would appear
valid to the PEP, so an attacker could gain access to the protected resource.
There are two approaches to preventing this possibility: securing the PDP
or forcing the PEP to check with multiple PDPs. We recommend the former
solution because it best fits with out model. But, if PDP hacks become a
problem, the latter solution may have to be examined.
7.3 PDP Management
As I mentioned earlier, the PDP will evaluate all management requests
against a root policy - including modifications to the root policy itself. So,
the security of the root policy is essential to assuring that the other policies
are legitimate. Here I faced a trade-off between security and convenience:
locking the root policy to prevent it from ever being modified would lessen
the chances of a hacker compromising the entire system, but would force ad-
ministrators to stop and restart the PDP if they ever wanted to change the
root policy. I chose the convenience solution because it allowed for greater
flexibility and ease of use. Also, if this PDP is implemented on secure hard-
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ware then the question of hacks becomes almost a moot point.
Up until now I have not addressed the issue of denial of service attacks.
This is the malicious flooding of a system with seemingly legitimate requests
designed to crash a server or prevent valid requests from being processed.
Since the PDP Management feature is most vulnerable to a denial of service
attack, I will discuss protective measures in this section.
By nature, it is difficult to differentiate between legitimate traffic and ma-
licious traffic because there is nothing inherently malicious in the packets
of a denial of service attack - just the sheer volume of those packets. The
best defense against these attacks is at the firewall level where packets from
certain IP addresses or packets destined for certain ports can be dropped.
This is an effective defense because very little time is required to process the
header of an TCP/IP packet and perform simple checks.
But, what happens if an adversary gets past our firewall and bombards our
PDP with XACML requests? Remember that we do not check evaluation
requests against our root policy to see who is allowed to make requests. So,
our system will dutifully process and reply to these requests. While this may
not be the ideal implementation, the alternative is no better. If we must
authorize the requestor before we process the request, then we’ve already
dedicated a substantial amount of processing power and time. Remember
that processing an XACML request requires parsing XML, searching for an
applicable policy, and matching that policy to the parsed request. All of these
operations are costly in terms of memory and latency. So even if we refuse
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to evaluate the individual requests made by a request in a denial of service
attack, the attack will still achieve its purpose of clogging our system. There-
fore, we leave security against denial of service attacks to alternate means. In
reality, most PDP systems could sit comfortably behind a strict firewall be-
cause they only need to communicate with a few external systems as shown in
our model. So accepting only connections from those system’s IP addresses,
and only listening on the limited number of ports that this software uses,
will protect against all but the cleverest denial of service attacks.
8 Conclusion
The concept of the Policy Decision Point has been evolving over the last
decade. In most software, it is intertwined with other components or ignored
altogether. But the PDP is starting to be defined as a separate system in
packages like Shibboleth. XACML takes this to the next level by providing a
language for writing, combining, and evaluating access control policies. This
software is an implementation of a PDP system built upon the Sun XACML
implementation and other open source projects. Also, I approach the PDP
as not just a separate system, but as one node in a network. This allows for
PDP collaboration and interaction with PDPs in other access control sys-
tems. Also, it enables all management to take place remotely so the PDPs’
operations can be thoroughly trusted.
This paper also suggests avenues for future research. The management
scheme I created works in many circumstances, but it should be standard-
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ized. With XACML, any environment information can be considered in mak-
ing decisions, so factors like disk size, remaining quota space, or processor
load can be considered in writing management policies. I recommended that
collaboration information also be stored as part of a policy, but the exact
parameters of this mechanism need to be developed. Also, the PDP should
be capable of keeping signed records to prove what decisions were made by
what PDPs. To keep the PDP decisions reliable, the system should be im-
plemented on secure hardware. This could be accomplished by running the
Java Virtual Machine on a secure platform or by compiling the PDP code
to run on the IBM 4758. Finally, my biggest recommendation is for people
to use this technology. Only by exposing these systems to thousands and
millions of users can we learn what challenges await.
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10 Glossary
• Certificate - A public key and some other information signed with a
private key. These are used to certify that a public key belongs to some
entity.
• DDOS - A Distributed Denial of Service attack is one that floods a
computer with bogus traffic from many different points on the internet.
• DNS - The Domain Name Server maps domain names to IP addresses.
For example, if you type ’dartmouth.edu’ into a web browser, it will
first make a DNS query to find out the IP address of Dartmouth’s
webserver so it can send the request to the right place.
• DOM - The Document Object Model is an interface for using and
manipulating the data in an XML document.
• Firewall - Software that regulates who is allowed to connect to a sys-
tem.
• IP Address - A unique number of the format xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx which
identifies a connection to the internet. These are used in routing packets
of data from one point on the internet to another.
• PKI - Public Key Infrastructure is a way of managing public key ex-
change through the use of certificates. The key component of PKI is a
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Certificate Authority that manufactures new certificates and manages
revocation lists.
• TCP/IP - The Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol is
the mechanism for transferring data over the internet. Data is divided
into packets, sent through the infrastructure of the internet, then re-
assembled at the receiving computer.
• SAML - The Security Assertion Markup Language is an OASIS stan-
dard defining the XML format for exchanging various pieces of infor-
mation regarding access control.
• SSL - The Secure Socket Layer is a protocol to encrypt communications
over the internet. See Appendix A.2 for a more detailed description.
• XACML - The eXtendable Access Control Markup Language is an
OASIS standard defining the XML format for access control requests,
response, and most importantly policies.
• XML - The eXtensible Markup Language is a way of encoding ”self
describing data.” See Appendix A.1 for a more detailed description.
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This will briefly explain some of the concepts and technologies that will be
referred to throughout this paper.
A.1 XML
XML [YBP+04] is a means of encoding information to include both data and
field names in one document. For example, a way of encoding your name




If a standard database were to store the same information, it would probably
use a much simplified form such as:
Geoffrey Stowe,geoffrey.stowe@dartmouth.edu
If an application wishes to store data for its own retrieval, XML is clearly a
wasteful approach because of the extra storage space it requires. However,
it is useful in transmitting information between different systems because it
does not rely on specific spacing, character encoding, etc. So, it is widely
used on the internet where communication can take place between different
programs running on different platforms used by people speaking different
languages.
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When XML is used in practice, specifically in the applications described in
this paper, it must be parsed by a program which extracts relevant informa-
tion and makes it available for use. Since all communications between the
components of our model use XML, we encountered many complications due
to XML-specific issues in implementing our model.
A.2 Public Key Cryptography and Certificates
Cryptography is the science of altering data in the hopes that only intended
recipients can understand it. An example taken from the pages of spy novels
could be one spy sending another a list of numbers like 12:56, 16:32, etc. The
receiving spy would then find some prearranged book and take the 56th word
on the 12th page, the 32nd word from the 16th page, etc. and reconstruct
the message. This is called a symmetric code because both the sender and
receiver need to have the same ”key” (which is a book in this case) in order
to communicate.
In the late 1970’s, three researchers at MIT named Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman developed a revolutionary new method of
encryption. It used two keys - one public and one private. If something is
encrypted with the public key, it can only be decrypted with the private key,
and vice versa. The benefit of this system is that anyone can know your
public key. In order to send a message to someone, you find their public key
(by asking them for it or by looking it up in a directory, for example) and
use it to encrypt a message to them. Then, the recipient can use their key
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to decrypt the message. This process can also work in reverse - someone can
encode a message using their private key. Then, anyone else can decode it
using that person’s freely available public key. This is called signing a docu-
ment because anyone can verify that only a person with access to the private
key could have produced the signed document.
While this system facilitated a new era of secure communication, it still has
a basic flaw - how does one know a public key is legitimate? Say Alice wants
to send a message to Bob, so she sends him an email asking for his public
key. But, a clever intruder whom we’ll call Trudy intercepts that message so
Bob never gets it. Trudy then send Alice a different public key (for which
she has the corresponding key) pretending to be Bob. Alice then encrypts
the message with Trudy’s public key and sends this to Bob. Trudy again
intercepts the message and is able to decode it. This is a version of what is
known as the ”man in the middle” attack.
The solution to this attack is to employ what are known as certificates.
A certificate is essentially a public key which some trusted authority has
signed. A system of Certificate Authorities and other public key verification
mechanisms is called a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI.) While browsing the
internet, you have probably seen a message about a certificate verified by a
company like Verisign, Entrust, or some other certificate authority. This is
a way of verifying that you, the buyer, are using the proper public key to
make a purchase. The actual mechanics of this communication are described
in the next section.
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A.3 SSL
If you’ve ever bought something online, chances are you’ve used SSL. [FKK96]
Designed by Netscape, it is a protocol to allow for secure communication be-
tween a client and a server. It can authenticate both the client and the
server, so both sides can be assured they are only communicating with an
entity that holds a certain private key. A slightly simplified version of the
process is the following: [Bas03]
• A client will contact a server and say it wants to use SSL for the
upcoming transaction.
• The server then sends a certificate back to the client (remember that
this certificate will contain the public key of the server.) The server
can also request the client’s certificate if it wishes to verify the identity
of the client. If it does so, it will send a structured message including
a random number which the client will use to validate itself.
• The client verifies that the server has sent a valid certificate, and it
makes up a pseudo-random which will be used as the session key. It
also signs the random number sent from the server and then sends this
information along with its certificate to the server.
• The server receives the client’s certificate and uses that public key to
decrypted the signed number the client sent. If it matches the number
the server originally sent, it knows with reasonable certainty that the
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client does indeed possess the private key it claims to.
• At this point, both the client and server have the session key. They
then use this to encrypt any information they want to send to each
other.
The reason a session key is generated is that this allows for faster encryption.
RSA is a costly algorithm relative to symmetric encryption, so SSL takes
advantage of the strengths of both symmetric and asymmetric encryption.
SSL is widely used because people are confident it is practically impossible
to break. Although problems have been found in some implementations of
SSL [CER03] the underlying protocol is sound. An attacker would presum-
ably need to either forge a certificate or guess the random session key in order
to eavesdrop on an SSL session. Both of these tasks are quite difficult if not
impossible to do in any reasonable amount of time.
A.4 Denial of Service Attacks
A denial of service attack is basically a flood of data directed at some system
on the internet. These attacks are commonly referred to as distributed de-
nial of service (DDOS) attacks because often times they come from multiple
sources. The key to a successful DDOS attack is to find a request you can
send to a server that uses a non-negligible amount of system resources. For
example, perhaps a poorly designed webserver will wait 1 second from the
time an initial connection is made for the client to request a webpage. While
it is waiting, it will not handle any other requests. More realistically, perhaps
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a webserver puts aside a small amount of memory every time a connection
is made to prepare for transferring data. In either case, flooding the server
with millions of bogus connection requests will stop it from functioning for
legitimate users. In the first case, it will be constantly waiting in response
to the bogus requests. In the second case, it will allocate all of its memory
for the bogus requests and crash.
In February, 2000, a wave of DDOS attacks were launched against popular
internet sites such as Yahoo, eBay, and ZDNet, shutting many of them down
for hours at a time. Since then, webservers have employed sophisticated
means of protecting against such attacks. [Har03] But although these com-
mon methods of launching DDOS attacks are now no longer as effective, the
threat is still very real on the internet. When some particularly infectious
viruses proliferate through the internet, the increased traffic has the effect
of a DDOS attack and can shut down networks. For this reason any secure
system should be designed with the possibility of a DDOS attack in mind.
B Choosing a Development Environment
I chose to use Java as my principle programming language because it was the
language used for Sun’s XACML implementation, and because I had the most
experience with it in the recent past. To choose a development environment,
I downloaded and tried out 4 Java IDE programs: NetBeans, Eclipse, Sun
One, and Code Warrior. I decided to go with Eclipse for a variety of reasons:
• Sun One had a trial period after which it cost money
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• Eclipse worked right off the bat unlike NetBeans, and the program is
about a quarter the size of NetBeans
• Eclipse was recommended by a few peers
• I have used Code Warrior in the past, but have experienced a lot of
unexplainable problems
• The Eclipse debugger seemed more robust than the debuggers included
with Code Warrior or NetBeans
• Eclipse successfully imported the sample PDP and basic XACML poli-
cies and requests with a minimal amount of debugging
Eclipse ultimately saved me a lot of time by managing library imports, pro-
viding built-in support for Javadoc, and automatically finding errors and
suggesting fixes. It is highly recommended to anyone embarking on a large-
scale coding project.
C Other Attempts at Creating Object Streams
Before developing the method of exchanging RequestCtx objects that we use
in our software, we tried several other approaches. I describe them here
because they represent some common problems other researchers might en-
counter, and suggest areas for future improvement.
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C.1 ObjectOutputStream
The first way we tried to send the object was with the native Java ObjectOut-
putStream and corresponding ObjectInputStream. These are subclasses of
the regular InputStream and OutputStream, so they can theoretically send
objects over a socket in much the same way that text can be sent. However,
the object must be serializable by implementing the Serializable interface in
order for the object streams to work. [Mic01a] Interestingly, the Serializable
interface does not require implementing any methods, but rather ”serves only
to identify the semantics of being serializable.” [Mic01b] RequestCtx objects
do not implement the serializable interface, so instead of changing the core
XACML code I created a wrapper class. This class ReqWrapper had a Re-
questCtx object as its only private variable. One interesting problem we ran
into was an apparent bug in Java that requires ObjectOutputStream objects
to be created before ObjectInputStream objects. [Roh01] However, even af-
ter fixing this problem we were unable to stream these wrapper functions,
probably because all subclasses of a serializable class need to be serializable.
C.2 Streaming XML
Our next approach was to stream the XML of a RequestCtx object over
a socket and rebuild the request to the other end. To accomplish this, we
used a similar set-up as with the Object Streams: a stream running in each
direction over a socket between the PEP and PDP. We then used the encode()
function built into the request to stream its XML encoding to the PDP which
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rebuilt the request by calling the getInstance() method. We then planned to
process the request and return the response over the same socket. However,
in testing this process, the socket kept closing before sending the response
back. We traced this problem to the native Java XML parser which is part
of JAXP. [Mic04c] The method javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder.parse()
takes an InputStream as input, and it appears it closes that InputStream
at some point. So, we were left with a catch-22. Getting the XML parser
to work required closing the stream, but closing the stream resulted in the
socket closing which meant we could not return a response.
Some research confirmed our suspicion and presented a possible solution:
Xerces. Xerces is an XML parser for Java implemented by Apache. [Fou04c]
Included in its packages is a class called socket.KeepSocketOpen which can
be used to stream multiple XML files over a socket. It works by wrapping
the stream in a WrappedInputStream [Cla02] and sending bytes over the
socket to be recombined at the other end. [Fou04b] Using this approach
the socket will not get closed after a single XML document has been sent.
Therefore, we could probably could have used this model to implement our
system. However, this would have required changing the core Sun XACML
implementation as well as rewriting our communications paradigm. Also,
since we were aiming to utilize SAML for sending our requests, we decided
against pursuing Xerces-specific classes too extensively.
Our temporary solution was to close the socket connection after the request
was sent. Then, the client would reconnect and receive the response to their
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request. This was a way to get around the problem of our socket closing, but
it also provided the benefit of enabling a request queue in the PDP. Under
this paradigm the client would ”drop off” a request for the PDP to process,
then come back when it needed the result. This would allow the PDP to
prioritize requests and work on the most important ones first. Also, it could
conceivably search more thoroughly to find attributes to support a request
if it didn’t have other requests to process. This approach, however, presents
serious security problems, the most major of which is how the PDP ensures
it returns a response to the same entity that made the request.
C.3 SOAP
One final approach we tried to improve upon the communication protocol
currently in our code was to use the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP).
The SOAP protocol is designed to exchange structured data between different
processes running on different systems. [GHM+03] In other words, it solves
many of the problems we encountered trying to stream XML directly over a
socket.
To use SOAP, we decided to try setting up a SOAP server and a SOAP
client. In the framework of our software, the PDP would function as a
SOAP server, and it could process requests from either the service or the
PEP. The SOAP server we chose to experiment with was Tomcat, an Apache
project. [Fou04a] Installing the Tomcat servlet engine required adding the
SOAP jar file and the JavaBeans Activation Framework [Mic04e]. It also
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required JavaMail [Mic04f] in order to support SMTP transfers which are
required by SOAP. I never succeeded in resolving classpath errors in my
Tomcat installation, so I did not integrate it with our framework. I also
chose to stop pursuing the option because it did not fit explicitly with our
communications model. If the PDP were the only ”server” then both the
service and PEP would have to initiate contact. Our model allows for the
PDP to initiate contact with the PEP. And although the PEP needs to
handle requests from the PDP, it should not be a server in the standard
sense because it handles a limited range of requests from a small group of
clients. Also, it will not return any information to the PDP.
Future access control implementations should consider using SOAP because
of its versatility in transmitting XML data. However, the model of access
control components may have to be altered to accomplish full integration
with SOAP.
D Implementing in a Secure Environment
Even if the communication channels between a PDP and the outside world
are secured through double-authenticated SSL encryption, a PDP can be
compromised by attacking the platform it runs on. For example, if a PDP is
running on an ordinary Windows desktop that an attacker has compromised,
incoming requests could be intercepted and always accepted. Or, if the poli-
cies can be altered, decisions can no longer be considered valid. So, the PDP
system should ideally be implemented on a secure platform that will ensure
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it makes consistent, reliable decisions.
I attempted to implement all my software on a secure platform, but was
unable to find an appropriate system. I will first survey some of the secure
hardware presently available, then discuss methods of implementing this PDP
system on a secure platform.
D.1 Secure Hardware
The theory behind the field of trusted computing is to find ways of estab-
lishing trust with the system you’re communicating with. It relies on some
trusted hardware which can be used to create a basis of trust for software.
Currently, secure hardware runs the gamut from tiny memory chips to large
processors. This technology is still in its infancy, yet even now it can provide
benefits to business. [Pea02]
Since our PDP system involves making decisions that cannot be tampered
with, we would require a secure processor. If we only used cryptographic
tokens, for example, we could ensure that policies were not tampered with
between storing them on the system and reading them into the PDP. How-
ever, if we were not running the PDP on trusted platform, a policy could
be tampered with once it is decoded but before it is processed by the actual
PDP system. Also, the PDP system could be altered to produce fraudu-
lent results. In a recent paper, John Marchesini describes a method to steal
private keys from web browsers by using a DLL Inject. This will place an
attacker between a program and its library functions allowing the attacker to
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view and possibly alter the functioning of a running process. [MSM04] This
same approach could be used to tamper with the PDP.
D.2 Using the IBM 4758 Secure Coprocessor
There is essentially one option for a completely secure processor: the IBM
4758 secure coprocessor. This is an ordinary microprocessor housed in an
environment that is both physically and electronically protected. The 4758
features battery-backed RAM so any unauthorized attempt to access the
memory will erase anything in storage. This is just one of the hardware
tamper responses that will detect intrusion attempts and automatically re-
spond by erasing sensitive information. The boot process, and all subsequent
operations, follow a careful sequence of trusted operations to ensure no unau-
thorized code is being executed. [DLP+01] The end result is a processor that
will execute precisely the software you load onto it, without intruders being
able to detect what operations it is performing, no matter how hostile an
environment it runs in.
The 4758 runs a stripped down version of the linux kernel, so my first efforts
concentrated on using Java on the 4758. It does not have the capacity to
run the full Java Virtual Machine, so it was not directly compatible with
my software. However, Java produces other versions of the Java Runtime
Environment, one of which is called the Java Micro Edition (JME). [Mic04b]
Researchers at Dartmouth have succeeded in running this version on the
4758. However the JME does not include an XML-parser, so we could not
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use the JME directly.
If not everything can run inside the 4758, an alternative is to run part of
the code on the secure platform and other parts on the host machine. For
example, policies could be read in through the secure platform, compute a
hash, sign the hash, and then stored externally. When the program needs to
use them, it will read them in from the external source, compute the hash,
then compare it to the signed hash. Only if these two match will the program
proceed. However, we would need to at least perform XML parsing outside
the secure environment leaving it vulnerable to the attacks described above.
So although we could ensure that the xml text which the processor received
has not been tampered with, we cannot ensure that the parsed XML tree is
valid. The only way we could ensure this is by parsing the XML text inside
a secure environment. It would seem reasonable for an XML parser to work
with the Java Micro Edition, but we were unable to find one. Therefore,
short of writing our own XML parser from the libraries in the JME, there
was nothing we could do to get our system running securely in Java on the
4758.
D.3 Other Secure Hardware/Java Card
Java Card technology is being developed by Sun as a stripped down version
of Java designed to run on cell phones, pay-tv boxes, or any type of smart
card. [Mic04d] This Maxim/Dallas Semiconductor Corporation is currently
producing a product called iButton. This is similar to a cryptographic token,
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but it includes the ability to run Java applets using Java Card technology.
The iButton includes up to 134Kbytes of RAM for its Java applets and even
runs a garbage collector. [Cor03] However, like the Java Micro Edition, Java
Card does not support XML.
D.4 Compiling the Java Code
Since I could not run the PDP system in Java on the 4758, I shifted my
efforts to compiling the Java code to native machine language. If successful,
this would allow the code to run on the Linux kernel inside the 4758. Java is
designed to compile to byte-code which can be run on any platform by the
Java Virtual Machine. However, it is a programming language like any other
and as such can theoretically be compiled to machine code. The only viable
Java compiler is GCJ, developed by the same people who make the GCC
compiler for C and C++. This compiler provides the capability to compile
either Java source code or Java class files into native machine code. [GNU02]
I had some limited success with gcj, but was not able to compile my en-
tire project to native machine code. I was able to successfully compile and
run a ”Hello World” program as well as the PolicySet class I wrote and in-
cluded in the PDPNode package. However, any classes that used another
class (such as the PDPSet class which has a set of PDP elements) produced
errors during gcj compilation. This is because the libraries they referenced
were not compiled or not linked in properly. Like regular command line C
or C++ compilers, libraries used in a program must be compiled separately
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and before compiling the main program. I was able to successfully compile
a test class that involved an external class, but could not do this for any of
the major parts of my project. To successfully compile the entire PDPNode
package, I would need to compile the 9 libraries it uses.
Let’s look at compiling the Sun XACML library as one example. The dis-
tribution includes a make file to build the code using javac. So, I changed
the line that sets the default compiler from javac to gcj. When I made this,
however, it produced hundreds of errors due to missing classes. So this one
library would require tracking down hundreds of external references and com-
piling them all in the proper order before I could compile the entire library.
I next checked the internet to see if other people had experienced, and pos-
sibly overcome, similar problems. It appears problems involving gcj are
somewhat common judging from internet message board postings. But gcj
seems to especially have problems with XML parsers, some of which have
not been resolved. 9 I found one reference to successfully compiling an XML
parser called XP [Bor99], and one person who compiled JAXP, a Java XML
parser developed by GNU. [Bor99] However, XP does not appear to sup-
port DOM which is required for SAML. [Cla98] JAXP also does not support
DOM. [Fou01]
It appears Xerces has been successfully compiled [Gre01] which is encourag-
ing because it is a major feature required by openSAML. However, it appears
9See for example [Per01]
65
Xalan has never been compiled,10 and without it there is no hope of compil-
ing openSAML.
I knew that even if I compiled everything, I still might have run into capacity
problems when trying to run this on the 4758. XACML.jar is 175k, open-
saml.jar is almost 100k, Xalan is over 1MB, log4j is almost 400k, xmlsec is
another 350k, and Xerces.jar is another 1MB. This is over 3MB just for the
libraries. This size may be feasible on the newer versions of IBM’s crypto-
cards, but not on the original 4758.
This concluded my attempts at getting my PDP system to run on a secure
platform. It is my hope that the next generation of secure hardware will be
capable of running the Java Virtual Machine. Since more and more devices
that humans interact with are running Java, its security and privacy will
become increasingly important in daily life.
10See for example [Gre01]
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